A Discussion about Swiftly

Swiftly coverSince the Matter discussion went down so well, I’ve decided to turn it into a regular, or at least semi-regular feature. On the table this time: Adam Roberts’ ninth novel, which is “a rip-roaring 19th century adventure, a love story and a thought-provoking pre-atomic SF novel about our place in the universe.” Or is it?

Your participants this time, who should need little introduction if you’ve been reading this blog for any length of time: me, Paul Kincaid, Victoria Hoyle, and Dan Hartland. If you haven’t read the novel, Dan’s review at Strange Horizons will give you some idea of what the book’s about; other online reviews worth a look are by Guy Haley, Nick Gevers, and Duncan Lawie. I kicked things off by asking for overall impressions of the novel …

Victoria Hoyle: I’ll start by saying this: I have always felt that Adam Roberts’ penchant for ideas and his novel writing have sat a little uneasily together — sometimes I think the latter has suffered from an over emphasis on the former. Up until Swiftly, though, I have been (mostly) satisfied that his books had coherent plots and characters, heightened by some excellent prose, that had the strength to carry the ideas through to their rightful conclusion. (For the record, of the four of Roberts’ books I’ve read I think Gradisil is the best, while Splinter is my peculiar favourite.) I felt that Swiftly failed in this regard. The first 80 pages (the two sections that have been published previously as short fiction) were wonderful. Muscular and toned and well-balanced, with strong characters to drive them. But I thought the later sections were positively surreal, plus a little clumsy, and I had great difficulty focusing on them around the huge lacunae in the plot. Characters fell through holes in time, and then reappeared utterly and inexplicably transformed. I found it impossible to put together as a single functioning narrative unit and, no matter the philosophy behind it, that is difficult for me to forgive.

Niall Harrison: I liked Swiftly a lot. I’m starting from a slightly different position to Victoria: I’ve read all of Roberts’ novels, and a majority of his short fiction; I’ve liked a lot of it, and admired almost all of it, so he’s clearly doing something that works for me. In fact, I think he’s been producing his best work in the last few years (as you’d hope, really) — I should probably say that during this time I’ve corresponded with him a bit as a result of my roles at Strange Horizons and Vector, but that’s just a happy coincidence. Swiftly struck me as a further development in three ways, all related. One, I think it’s the book in which he’s most successful at foregrounding his characters, or achieving a balance between the characters and the ideas he wants to explore. Two, I think it’s in many ways his most relaxed book, in a good way — in Swiftly he seems more willing to leave loose ends, to not have everything tied up in a little package of Meaning. I think the shift in tone that Victoria identifies is part of this. And three, I think it’s the most successful outing for Roberts-the-author-as-critic. I don’t know enough of Gulliver’s Travels to be able to pick up the nuances of his engagement with the book, but I enjoyed the various ways in which he explores the basic idea — and brings in dialogue with other texts.

Paul Kincaid: For the record, I like Roberts’ non-fiction, and though there is much to argue with in the book I have immense admiration for his History of sf. But I have never been able to get on with his fiction. Every novel or story I’ve read has disappointed me in some way or other. Swiftly seems to bring together all my discontents.

To start with, it is incoherent, and becomes more so as the book goes along and Roberts simply crams in more references to sf history. Obviously he is overt about the Jonathan Swift references, but the opening, when we first see the Lilliputians at work, owes more to Beatrix Potter’s The Tailor of Gloucester than it does to anything in Swift. And then he has to jemmy in Voltaire’s Micromegas (Littlebig). I think he assumes that because all these are concerned with scale, they can be pushed together with no harm, but that is just not the case. In the end I’m almost sorry that he didn’t try to squeeze Alice into the mix, it would have made about as much sense as everything else.

Then I think it is clumsy. As Victoria says, characters are simply forgotten for long stretches of the book, then brought back in because he needs them for some little bit of business. This is particularly true of the Lilliputians and the Brobdignagians, who never come across as anything other than authorial devices. Given that this is a book that is supposed to be about them, the careless way that they have no part to play in most of what goes on is amazing.

And the characterisation is so inconsistent that I spent a large part of the book thinking that through some oversight he had simply given exactly the same name to two totally different women. As we leave Eleanor the first time she is living with her mother, she has just witnessed the gruesome murder of her hated husband, she is living in a big house in fashionable London, she is negotiating for a mortgage to pay the fine of a treasure seeker, she is so ignorant of sex that she is frigid. The very next time we see her she is walking north alone. There is no indication of how she got there, there is not a single reference to her mother, her house, her husband, the treasure-seeker. And she has gone inexplicably from being frigid to being sexually manipulative. What on earth has gone wrong here? Does no-one else think this is at the least careless and at the worst witless?

Niall: I have to say, I didn’t find Eleanor nearly as inexplicable as Paul and Victoria did. If anything, my first reaction was that the dramatic transition from sexual repression to sexual exploration was perhaps a little clichéd — an overly-familiar idea of how a repressed person might suddenly go wild when freed from the constraints of family and circumstance. But I certainly didn’t think it was inconsistent.

Eleanor is introduced to us as a rationalist, scientific personality, fascinated by everything about the way the world works, but held back from direct engagement with it. Her interest in sex is almost the prototypical example of this — when she realises how human procreation must work, she’s not disgusted or reticent, she’s simply embarrassed that she didn’t already know. And so she decides that “the proper scientific thing to do [is] to study the phenomenon more carefully” (73). Of course her first attempt to doing that is to read, but that doesn’t get her very far; and because it doesn’t get her very far, because she understands everything intellectually first, her first physical relationship is a disaster.

When Bates’ invasion of her privacy spurs her transformation — and I do think it’s that moment that causes the change in her behaviour; there’s no sign that when she’s first picked up by Bates’ party that she’s already become so adventurous — it does so in ways consistent with her character. She approaches sex clinically, taking every opportunity to see how Bates reacts, or to study the way his body reacts, to what she does.

But if it’s not inconsistent, it is obviously discontinuous. And on that score, on the one hand, I can agree it’s a weakness — part three of the book is my least favourite, and that’s at least in part because Bates’ perspective is so stifling. On the other hand, though, it’s clearly deliberate, and it’s effective precisely because I find Eleanor interesting and would like to see more of her (and when we get to part four, the opening-out has that much more power). One aspect of the book is that our lives are shaped by forces we can’t always see or grasp: things like class at the upper end of the scale, things like bacteria at the lower end. A big part of the plot is carried out by sub-Lilliputian creatures we never see — we have to deduce that they were in the calculating machine, that they caused the disease, and so on – so it doesn’t surprise me in the least that we’re asked to deduce similar amounts about one of the human-scale characters. The dots aren’t particularly hard to join — London’s just been sacked, it’s not at all surprising Eleanor’s become a refugee — but they’re part of a strategy that runs throughout the book of refusing to give us some of the narrative satisfactions we expect a novel (perhaps particularly a science fiction novel) to give. The elisions are so precise that it’s impossible for me to see it as carelessness on Roberts’ part.

Dan Hartland: Swiftly is a troubling book, and that seems to me a good sign. As you all probably know, I reviewed it for Strange Horizons. It has to be said, in hearing of the editor no less, that I usually know what I’m going to say about a book I’m reviewing for Strange Horizons, and with pretty decent definition, by the time I finish its last page. This is because most of them are open-and-shut cases, largely due to their common and garden simple-mindedness. When it comes to Swiftly, I agree with a little bit of what everyone has said so far, and this reflects the fact that when I finished it, I wasn’t quite sure whether it was good.

But ultimately, I gave it a decently positive review. A large part of this is due to what Niall was talking about re: its intertextuality. Roberts is pretty obviously playing with ideas from his History of sf, and as Victoria points out at times writing good fiction and exploring ideas well are not necessarily compatible. But I disagree with Paul: the texts Roberts references do not crowd each other out, since he never goes as far to draw much more out of them than the reference itself. I was impressed by the novel’s sense of place, by how well it sits in its chosen milieu, and I think it achieves that by not over-simplifying it own concerns or those of the period in which it is (sorta) set.

Naturally this makes the book unwieldy. In that review of mine, my big source of complaint is just what Victoria picks up on when she talks about lacunae. It’s not just the large gaps of time that characters fall through, though — yes, Eleanor is transformed between her appearances, but Bates twists and turns in moments and pages just to get to the moral resolution Roberts wants him to achieve. I found this pretty difficult to swallow, and Niall’s defense of it — that the ellipsis is sort of a stylistic echo of the invisible agents the book is based around — doesn’t really help the reader escape the dislocation it engenders. Yet, like Niall, I had no problem with Eleanor’s change in circumstances at the novel’s half-point: she has implicitly lost everything which gave her life structure, and this has clearly killed the structuralist. She then rebuilds herself through experience, and more problematic are the on-a-dime nature of those experiences. She sees war on a Real Time Strategy screen and — poof! — she develops human empathy. It’s the psychological baby steps Roberts fumbles, not the leaps or the set-ups.

On the large canvas, Swiftly may veritably teem, and may defy easy categorisation or distillation … but I’m not at all that’s not a sign of its strength.

Paul: Niall, the idea that the lacunae in the book in some way stand for the influence of forces on a different scale is attractive, but that’s not what’s in the book.

The reason I have a problem with Eleanor is the problem of memory. One of the most significant things that goes into shaping our character, and that is imperative for the continuity of that character, is memory. The persistence of memory is one of the things that defines us. In Eleanor there is no such persistence. When we leave Eleanor at the end of book two she has just witnessed the horrendous murder of her husband, her life is focussed on caring for her mother, she is even mortgaging her home for the sake of a fortune hunter. When we meet her again at the beginning of book three every single one of those things is completely absent, and is never referred to again. Even if she hated her husband and wanted rid of him, that murder at least would have had some effect on her consciousness. But no, it is excised from the record. Beyond her interest in science, which is of a somewhat different character in book two to the rest of the novel, there is not one jot that even connects the two Eleanors.

Nor is it sufficient to say that there has been an invasion and she has become a refugee. Because there is nothing other than the circumstances of the meeting on the road that actually marks her as a refugee. She has been forced out of her home, she has been forced away from her mother who had been the most important figure in her life, as a refugee in a time of war she had almost certainly witnessed scenes of chaos or mayhem, yet none of this has had an iota of effect upon her. She is a refugee who behaves from the instant of her reappearance as if she has undergone nothing more exciting or threatening or life-changing than a Sunday afternoon stroll. She is not a character, she is a contrivance to allow Roberts to set up situations as he will.

And if the discontinuities in Eleanor’s character are the most blatant, the discontinuities in Bates’ character are no less serious. He is a puppet, and where most puppetmasters would make an attempt to walk the puppet from point A to point B, Roberts simply whips him up and plonks him down willynilly without even a nod in the direction of verisimilitude.

But then, why expect coherent and consistent characters in a plot that makes no pretense of coherence or consistency? The Lilliputian in his flying machine who accompanies Bates for so much of the latter part of the book is simply forgotten for page after page when the plot has no need of him, only to re-appear miraculously just at the point where he is needed to rescue Bates, then is just as promptly forgotten again. A plague that touches each of our central characters but leaves them effectively unharmed then proves instantly and unfailingly fatal to every other human being it touches. Sorry, credulity can only stretch so far.

With most books, I’ve found, even bad books, if you are prepared to take it on trust right from the start then suspension of disbelief becomes easier as the story is developed. In this case, I wasn’t bowled over with the first part, I thought its shifts were far too abrupt, but I was prepared to give it the benefit of the doubt. But in fact my disbelief increased as the novel progressed. I wasn’t being drawn into the world, in fact I found myself more and more being pushed out of it. Every few pages I was being asked to swallow some behavioural trait that made a mockery of everything we’d been told about the characters to that point. Every few pages I’d be asked to swallow some twist of the plot that was totally arbitrary. Every few pages I’d be asked to accept something that seemed like arrant nonsense to me.

This is a jeu d’esprit, a showing-off, a game to be played with bits and pieces from the history of sf. It is not a novel.

Dan: Paul’s pungency aside, I’m not sure we’re getting to the heart of things here. I can’t at all buy that Roberts wasn’t aware how odd a choice having Eleanor pop up, unannounced and unfamiliar, was going to be. The question of whether or not his choice is successful is being duly answered each to their tastes, but if Niall’s explanation doesn’t cut it then there is surely one that does. It occurs to me again that citing the severity of Eleanor’s position at the close of book two does not count as providing evidence that her state when she reappears is unlikely or unacceptable. It occurs to me that, having achieved what she had at such a cost, having even that then robbed from her would lead to precisely the dissolution of character Paul’s arguing does not follow. What occurs to Eleanor is that her natural tendency towards detachment is followed to its natural conclusion — disassociation. It is with the renewed perspectives she gains towards the ends of the book that she coalesces again into something resembling a person.

I have more sympathy with your problem with Bates, though, Paul. He is indeed jerked from pillar to post purely to reach predefined ends. Perhaps it is precisely the fact that we do see most of Bates’s important character moments which makes them for me less handwaveable. That and, I think, the fact that he is clearly meant to retain a character throughout. Eleanor, on the other hand, isn’t. If this is a mistake on Roberts’s part, so be it, but I don’t agree that it’s one he did not aim to make.

It might also be worth pointing out, perhaps, that character consistency is hardly a trait on show in Gulliver’s Travels, and that, quite the opposite to the manners in which Bates constantly shifts, Gulliver never really seems to learn a thing from journey to journey…

Victoria: I find that I am apt to agree (almost entirely) with Paul on Swiftly‘s weaknesses of character and plot. It strikes me that, for the most part, Niall and Dan accept them too, even as they try to explain them as an inherent part of the narrative’s landscape. But I’m troubled by the way our arguments keep dodging back to Roberts, as author of the work, in an incredulous disbelief at (what I perceive to be) his failure. So Dan says: “I can’t at all buy that Roberts wasn’t aware” etc and argues that, if Niall’s argument isn’t valid, then there surely must be one that is. And Niall suggests, implicitly, that Roberts’ “carelessness” can’t be accidental. To some extent these are apologetics based on what we already know (or think we know) about Roberts as an author; they’re founded in our trust of his skill and his intellectual prowess. I find them unconvincing because often (although not always) they’re based on assumptions imposed from outside the text; they are hypothesis founded on “second guessing” Roberts’ intent in a favourable light.

I’m not hostile to this kind of thinking altogether — I want Roberts to have written another great novel — but first, I need the text to speak for itself. It should work for itself, in and of itself. It has to be its own justification, at least in part. It can’t expect the reader to make great cognitive leaps alone, or rely entirely on playing referential games with its audience. If you have to have read Gulliver’s Travels, and invested deeply in the history of sf, to understand it, then it has failed at a basic functional level. It has become niche and, dare I say, elitist. So, for example: I need to see some evidence for Eleanor’s character change in the text. As Paul says, it isn’t enough to fill in the holes in the plot with scenarios of our own devising. Because if Eleanor is completely detached from her previous life when Bates meets her on the road, if she is so completely alienated from herself that she isn’t traumatised by the loss of her mother, of her home and of her way of life, then what is the point of it being her at all. Bates may as well meet a random woman on the road, since essentially she is completely devoid of history. For our purposes, she is a new character entirely. The only continuity is her devotion to scientific thinking, which Niall has stressed, but it is not enough. Certainly it is not enough to constitute a full human being — she is nothing but a scooped out shell. What has happened to Eleanor to so thoroughly strip her of the emotionality, the passion, which was also evident in the first part of the novel? She has been turned to stone, a dominatrix for the plot. Roberts’ has to justify this for himself; we can’t do it for him.

I hate to say this, because it is such a common criticism of Roberts’ work, but I think, essentially, Swiftly lacks a sense of humanity. It doesn’t connect with the ways in which people respond, emotionally, to crises and change. I’ve never felt it before — I’ve liked Roberts’ coolness, and I haven’t thought him overly clinical like others have. But Swiftly is too surgical a novel; all the heart has been cut out of it. It has tipped the scale from taut emotional control into a species of hollowness. I can just about imagining arguing the pros, and I can appreciate Niall’s sentiment in parts, but I still think it a failed novel.

Niall: I’m going to turn away from Eleanor for a bit, and address some of the other points that have come up. Broadly speaking, I agree with what Dan has been saying and disagree with Paul and Victoria, which is as much of a surprise to me as anyone. This is not to say that I expect Dan to agree with what I’m about to say, of course.

Victoria, you suggest I’m prepared to accept Swiftly‘s weaknesses of character and plot. I’m prepared to accept that the sense of discontinuity in both is a key aspect of the book; I’m not prepared to accept that it’s a weakness. Like Dan, when I finished the book I wasn’t sure exactly what I thought of it, but I found that weeks later it kept nagging at me — more than anything else I’d read in the interim — and that is usually a good sign, meaning that part of my brain has realised there’s more to get out of a book. So I went back and started thinking about it again.

While I find the setting utterly convincing, in the ways in which the various Pacifican peoples have been integrated into 19th-Century Europe, as I said at the start I haven’t actually read Gulliver’s Travels, so I don’t think it was sf-history connections I was picking up on. (I did subsequently read Micromegas, and since Voltaire explicitly nods in Swift’s direction, I don’t think its influence on Swiftly is at all crammed in or arbitrary.) I’ve come to think that what was nagging at me was the ways in which the real story of the book is hidden or obscured by its ostensible focus on Bates.

The most obvious way in which this happens is part three, which is so claustrophobically narrow in its focus that the external world all but disappears. The changes and movements that, we find out at the start of part four, have been going on seem all the more dramatic because they happened offstage (as with, for me, Eleanor’s character). Pretty much everything else important happens offstage, or in marginal moments, too; Bates and Eleanor’s immunity to the plague, which Paul mentions, is an obvious example, since it’s a long time before it’s explained that they were essentially vaccinated by their early exposure to the sub-Lilliputians in the calculating engine. Victoria, you ask that the text speak for itself: to me, this pattern, repeated so often in the novel’s largest elements and in its smallest, is the text speaking for itself. It’s the neatness with which the structure of the novel mirrors its themes — the shaping effect of class on a large scale, and of emotions on an intimate scale — and the consistency with which it is applied that convinces me it’s intentional, not some abstract trust in Roberts’ smarts.

And in that vein — whether it was intended or not — I think Swiftly functions as, among other things, a parody of the conventions of sf, in the same way that (I gather) Gulliver’s Travels is a parody of travelogue conventions. Things that we expect an sf novel to put front and center are obscured; every potential moment of wonder is undermined by something base and human; and so on. Another review described Bates and Eleanor’s relationship as “an amusingly apt rebuke to the 19th-century romantic novel”, which is something I’m certainly not qualified to judge, so I may be on the wrong track entirely, or there may be elements of both (having now read most of Quicksilver, what Bates and Eleanor’s relationship mostly strikes me as is a parody of Jack and Eliza’s relationship). Either way, I like the feeling that there is more to dig at, more to get out of this book than one reading has revealed to me.

Dan: Niall’s spot on, Victoria — were he and I trying to excuse a bad book on the basis of wishful thinking, I’d be happy to be first up against the wall. The point we are making is rather that the indications are in the text that this is a far more considered work than you or Paul are willing to allow. In its third line, we are introduced to the difficulty of perceiving detail on levels other than our own (“Bates could not see whether it was a he or a she”). Though he can make out creases of concentration, and even the tip of a tongue, on the Lilliputian before him, anything beyond what it is that he or she is doing — even a thing as simple as its gender — is out of sight. Critics of sf conventions like myself may see something of their own misgivings in that — all but the action is invisible.

And so it is in Swiftly, except that the absence of context, rather than going unnoticed, has attention drawn to it time and again. Eleanor’s change, the invasion of Britain itself, the grip of the plague (and Niall is right to point out that its sparing of the main characters is indeed explained away), the means by which the Pacificans were brought to Europe, what in other novels would have been the denouement itself … all are skipped grandly and brazenly. And what instead we are presented with are exaggerated instances of the sort of claustrophobic single-character perspectives a modernist might deploy in precisely the exploration of “humanity” Victoria perceives as missing from the book. Swiftly is toying with us, not a little cruelly.

Gugglerum tells Bates that the French should be the allies of the English, since they share an enemy whom they fight “and do not even notice” (296). Likewise, Eleanor, detached and disassociated Eleanor, suddenly realises what process it is that is going on in her: “She became aware of a new quality in her emotions, something that had been steadily cultivating itself inside her without her even being aware of the growth. She became aware of shame” (320). Shame, opposed as it is to the pride which is seen by the novel to be the sickest of man’s ills, but for what? For the murder, for failing to protect her family, for her scientific detachment, for her lack of humanity. This psychological imperative has been at work within her without her — and, in the absence of that ridiculously strangulating focus on a single character, us — noticing it. This may not be an effective means of structuring a novel (Paul may well be right that it is a collection of literary ideas rather than a story), but it is not engaging properly with the text to suggest it is not the means Roberts has actively, knowingly and deliberately chosen. Paul, you suggested the book has no coherence. Is it more the, wholly justifiable, case that the coherence it does have is not to your taste?

Paul: I don’t for a moment doubt that everything in Swiftly is intentional, for me the intentionality of the novel is not an issue. It is what he does with those intentions that bothers me. I’m entirely in agreement with Victoria here, in that Dan and Niall seem to be spending more time finding excuses for Roberts rather than accepting that there is a real and deep problem with this novel.

Niall says that the book lodged in his mind, which he sees as a good thing. But he sees it as a form of logical puzzle that he has to unpick (with no guarantee that there is a solution). To me that is exactly the wrong reason for thinking that the book is good. For me a sign that a book is good is if it lodges in the mind because it is rich, it opens up layers. There is no richness in Swiftly for me, rather it sticks in my mind for its poverty. Yes, it is possible to construct explanations for the works discontinuities, for the insubstantial characters, for the gaping holes in the plot — but these are not explanations we are led teasingly towards by what is in the book; rather they are things we have to construct out of whole cloth because they are so strikingly absent from the book. As Victoria says, it is cold, detached, distant; it is almost autistic in its failure to comprehend or convey human emotion.

As Niall says, virtually every event of any importance happens off stage. We are not taken into the world because we don’t see it. We have to construct scenarios to get us from A to B because there is no logical movement from A to B within the novel itself. Everything that happens comes as a shock not because it is a sudden jarring of a carefully constructed world picture, but because it comes out of the blue with no sense or context.

And Dan, it really is no excuse that Roberts’ characters are inconsistent because Swift’s were inconsistent also. For a start Roberts is not writing an 18th century novel, he’s writing a 21st century novel. And secondly, he’s setting the novel in 1848 when (as he would know professionally) the manners and styles of writing were vastly different from how they had been when Swift wrote.

Actually that is something else that bothers me about the book. Why did he very deliberately choose 1848, the year of revolutions? The Franco-British war (what pitifully small portion of it we glimpse) bears more relationship to Napoleonic era warfare nearly half a century earlier. And Bates’s limp, self-serving liberation movement is a poor substitute for the political ferment that was actually going on at the time.

Dan: Paul, I think the very fact that the novel does not resemble in any way an eighteenth century one might be reason enough to suspect Roberts isn’t trying to ape Swift’s characterisation. Rather, as Niall and I were arguing, the very mode he chooses — that strange single character perspective which eliminates all other personalities from its remit — is sort of uber-Jamesian (b. 1843), or more broadly Victorian, in its prim insistence on the primacy of character. And yet it subverts our expectations of that mode by, as you say, emphasising the endpoints rather than the process. I agree that this is a strange and frustrating way to “do” character, but when I pointed out Swift’s own inconsistences I was shooting for a more complex relationship between Roberts and Swift (and on the part of the former a more complex understanding of characterisation than “it began after the eighteenth century”) than you allow.

I was interested by the choice of 1848, too, and because I found the warfare similarly odd for the age. There is, I guess, a revolution in understanding by the end of the novel, but the easy labour the Pacificans provide has understandably led to a stagnation of European society but also perhaps its mild gentrification (early on, one character remarks that the giant cows have eliminated hunger on the streets, suggested that the proletariat may have less to revolt about, and the grunt work is no longer done by them). It occurred to me that 1848 was chosen not because the book intended to depict a revolution but because it wanted an easy way to signify the consequences of its premise. This 1848 is a bit timelocked, and without revolution. Again, it’s a deliberate subversion of a marker, a defenestration of a signifier.

I wonder if we aren’t going around in circles, though, because I do acknowledge what Paul and Victoria are saying — certainly the characterisation and plot structure of Swiftly is not perfect, and in large part this is because they are subject to thematic strictures. But, and it pains me to stick up for Niall, I think it’s unfair on him to say his response to the novel is a logician’s. I think he is responding to a textual richness, or at the very least a textual glut — it may be a cloying over-richness, and Roberts may have ruined his book by throwing too much theme, reference or playfulness at it, but I don’t see it as thin. Victoria called the book hollow, and that may perhaps be fairer if its concerns don’t quite ring true. But concerns it undoubtedly has, and I’m a bit baffled by the strength of reaction against it. At worst, surely it’s a not overly sober bit of thinking which is just trying a bit too hard?

Niall: What I should have said about importance is “pretty much everything we as readers would normally consider important happens off-stage”. I think this should make us ask whether those events are actually important, and if not, what we are meant to think is important, and to me that sort of question leads precisely to an opening-up of the book, rather than “solving” it or reducing it. I think some of Roberts’ earlier books are vulnerable to that sort of criticism, that they end up saying one thing too clearly; but while I think in some instances Swiftly does lead us towards an understanding of what’s been happening off-stage – the quote Dan cited about Eleanor’s half-understood emotional shift is one example – what I like about it is that it’s so open to potential readings, that it’s so not reducible. Perhaps I’m being generous to the novel because its idiosyncracies are refreshing when compared with the utter transparency of so much contemporary (particularly genre) sf; but that doesn’t seem to me such a bad reason for generosity.

Victoria: I’m beginning to suspect that a) we’re choosing to focus our analysis on different aspects of the novel — theme/structure vs. character/plot, I think — rather than disagreeing about either. Which puts me in the uncomfortable position of concurring with some of what Niall and Dan say specifically, while disagreeing more generally; and b) I’ve over-emphasised my dislike of the novel. I should reiterate that I didn’t hate Swiftly. I read parts of it with great pleasure. I just happen to think that, overall, it is an unsuccessful work. I am willing to accept that (what I perceive as) its weaknesses are intentional on Roberts’ part; but I don’t accept that they acheive their aims. For me, Swiftly is an experiment gone wrong.

But first, Niall, I agree with what you say about “the real story” being “hidden” by the focus on Bates and Eleanor, although I think I would change “real story” to “real ideas”. I contend that Swiftly doesn’t really have a “story”. It has events and happenings in a sequence. (Implicitly, this means I disagree with Dan that Swiftly insists on the “primacy of character” — I think this may be true of the first sections, but not the later ones.) And I can see that what you argue in the following paragraph — that “the structure of the novel mirrors its themes” — is right too. This in itself is not a weakness. But my problem has always been that there is no integration of this strong tide of structure/theme with the plot/character. I’m beginning to wonder if Roberts’ hasn’t sacrificed character (and, to some extent, coherent narrative) altogether in a quest for ideas — Eleanor and Bates are just a way in to the theory, which is why they don’t make sense as people. As I said originally, the ideas outweigh the narrative device. For me, the cleverness or not of Roberts’ schema (and I’m mostly convinced now that it is clever) is beside the point if his fictional conceit is crumbling around it. I don’t believe that a novel can function properly — that is, fully, as a whole text — with one and not the other. In Swiftly, we have a glut of ideas — concepts aplenty — but a cast of characters that act and react to (contrived) situations like conceptual analogies rather than human beings.

Which leaves me considering an essential question, I suppose: does Swiftly need a plot or successfully functioning characters in order to work? I’m glad Dan made the comparison with modernist novels, which have been in the back of my mind too. I don’t think Swiftly has anything in common with the great modernists stylistically or philosophically, but I think structurally there is a comparison to be made. As I’ve been arguing against its lack of narrative and character development, I’ve found myself expressing opinions that I don’t generally hold. I’m usually a great fan of non-linear, non-comformist novels; Woolf is the writer of fiction that I most admire. So why am I unable to accept Roberts’ particular vision in Swiftly? The more I muse on it, the more I think it’s less the absence of coherent character development, and more the stylistic schizophrenia that bothers me. The novel’s characters are human, emotional and passionate in the early sections, then discontinuous, cold and arbitrary in the latter half, even though both parts of the novel deal with their intimate experience. I can see how this might tie into Roberts’ thematic shifts between microcosm and macrocosm, and between inner/outer worlds. And I know that it mirrors the inconsistencies of character in many early novels of philosophical and conceptual bent, from which I think Roberts’ is claiming descent. I can even see how it subtly turns Swiftly into a meta-fiction, a commentary on how arbitrary character generation in fiction is. Yet I don’t seem to be able to get past it.

I think it is because Swiftly wants to merge an early device, of fiction as a carrier for ideas, with a species of post-Victorian realism and a contemporary vision. It turns out to be like mixing oil and water, so that which ever way I look at the novel it has holes in it or strange growths sticking off it. Which makes for an interesting intellectual exercise, but not a strong, rounded novel. It would have been better, I think, had Swiftly jettisoned mimesis altogether and gone completely wild, throwing continuity and character to the wind. Better a complete disavowal of narrative traditions and the making of something new, than a clashing mismash of flesh-and-blood realism with puppet-characters and allegory. Niall, I now think you’re right. The text does speaks, but only convincingly as regards theme and structure. These it ruminates over in abundance. I also think you’re right that structure is meant to act as a function of character and plot. In this case, it is Roberts’ first cause, the God of his text; the structure of his world = the structure of the novel and its inhabitants. I just don’t think that it works.

Paul: Dan, I have to say that I am quite happy to regard Swiftly as a jeu d’esprit, a game without much consequence that plays with ideas from the history of sf. If I don’t have to take it seriously, then I’m fine. My problem is that the more seriously I think about the book, and the more you and Niall claim for it, the more I dislike it, the more I find wrong with it in terms of structure, quality of writing, characterisation, sense — in other words all the basic things that make a novel work for me.

Dan: I think we’re heading towards a natural conclusion, but there are a few more things I want to say. I think Victoria comes closest to synthesising our positions, or perhaps summarising our differences, when she makes her point about the novel’s schizophrenia. Undoubtedly to my mind, Roberts is doing exactly what Victoria argues: trying to fuse that older tradition of fiction as an ideas delivery mechanism with a post-Victorian realism. As we’ve been discussing, this results in some very odd choices and some quite jarring juxtapositions.

It’s also why I made that point about primacy of character — not because I think that Swiftly is a traditionally character-driven novel (again, Victoria is quite right to say it is not), but because I think it is interrogating those kinds of fictions. In that sense, I agree also with Paul — the best way to see Swiftly is as a jeu d’esprit with a sort of seriousness of searching purpose. That is not to argue that it is a sober book, but rather to suggest that it is like Lear’s Fool, incoherent and scatological, but ultimately commenting with skewed perspicacity on the fundamental elements of its mileu.

This inevitably makes it a work which it is neither easy nor necessarily possible to digest as we would expect, like or prefer. I think this makes it much less than a successful novel, as Victoria says (but then, I’m not at all sure it’s even trying to confirm to those elements we might consider essential in “a successful novel”). But perhaps it also makes it much more than a bad text.

Victoria: Nicely summed up Dan. After all our wrangling I also feel as though we have come to something of a natural stopping point. I certainly agree with you that Swiftly is “more than a bad text”, and I feel more reconciled to it now, as a disconcerting scatological experiment if not as a novel.

Paul: I think if I were to try to sum up my feelings about Swiftly it would disappointment.

I am, like Roberts, something of a historian of science fiction, and Gulliver’s Travels and Micromegas were both exciting books within that history. I think I expected something more of a novel that tried to synthesise the two.

For a start, both Swift and Voltaire were writing philosophical works in one form or another, the placement of ideas was central to the whole purpose of both books. But Roberts has ditched ideas, I get no sense of any seriousness of purpose behind this novel. Instead we get disconnected chunks of crude action interspersed with scatalogical sexuality. But where sex in a novel usually helps to explore the mental landscape of the characters, there is no inner landscape to explore because there is no real character. The characterisation, like the plot, is so choppy that it becomes incoherent.

I’m okay with this so long as we can dismiss the novel as lightweight, a bit of fun. But the more Dan and Niall try to present the book as in some way significant (mostly, it seems to me, by extrapolating ideas into the setting of the novel that aren’t actually there in the text) the flimsier and more unconvincing the whole thing feels. Which is why I come across as so antagonistic. Swiftly could have been a really interesting novel of ideas, instead it is so incoherent that it barely comes across as a novel to me.

So yes, like Dan I think we’ve really come to a natural conclusion of our discussion. If we continue it further, I suspect you are just going to entrench me further into my dislike of the book.

Niall: Well, short of heading off into a debate about what a novel is — which I believe Dan, at least, is on record as regarding as an impossible question to answer — I think I also have to agree that we’ve reached the end of the line. I wonder if we’ll have persuaded anyone to try it for themselves — or avoid it?

The Goosle

One of the reasons I wanted to get my hands on the Ellen Datlow-edited Del Rey Book of Science Fiction and Fantasy was Margo Lanagan’s “The Goosle” — not just because I usually admire Lanagan’s stories, but because the reactions to this story, as tracked on Lanagan’s blog, have been interesting. They have been generally enthusiastic (or enthusiastic but nervous about how Lanagan might react), and occasionally bizarre, but a number have had an undercurrent of uneasiness: Alvaro Zinos-Amaro, for instance, says that though he “appreciated the creativity and inventiveness on display,” he’s “not sure the viciousness created a disturbing experience rather than an off-putting one”; and in general the descriptions emphasize how dark the tale is.

And now Dave Truesdale has reviewed the anthology, as one of his “Off on a Tangent” columns, and attacked “The Goosle”. (It’s interesting that this column appears under the SF Site banner, rather than as an online column for F&SF, although it’s not the first of the columns to do so.) Before I go any further, in case you haven’t followed any of the links above, a brief review of the premise: the story is a sequel to a version of “Hansel and Gretel” in which Gretel (here Kirtle) didn’t escape, and Hansel was found wandering by a man called Grinnan. The two now travel together, with Grinnan regularly and sexually abusing Hansel (“goosle” is one of his names for the boy; in the original “silly goose” is what the witch says as she demonstrates her oven to Gretel), and as “The Goosle” opens they pay a return visit to the witch, here called the “mudwife” (one of Lanagan’s common linguistic tricks is to corrupt existing word; here we’re obviously meant to think “midwife”, and there is a suggestion that the mudwife may act in that capacity for some locals). Here’s a sample of Truesdale’s judgement:

Del Rey ought to get a long, loud, wakeup call… and quick. If the author, editor, and publisher can nuance this story, massage it, spin it to where the objectionable inclusion of child rape for shock value alone is acceptable, then there are absolutely no boundaries, for any reason, anywhere — and we can expect more of the same. This sets a precedent, if not challenged. And again, what audience were the editor and publisher expecting to hit here? Several stories seem written just for a younger crowd, so then what can be the reasoning behind also presenting a fairy tale retelling with repeated instances of child rape for shock value?

To sum up, his charges are: that the story is inappropriate given what he judges to be the likely audience for the anthology; that the abuse is included for “shock value” and crosses the bounds of decency, specifically in a scene where “young Hansel thinks he might even like what is being done to him”; and that it adds nothing to the story specifically or to “the canon of Hansel and Gretel”.

To take these points in order: Truesdale’s perception of the anthology as being marketed, at least in part, at young adult readers seems to rest entirely on the fact that several protagonists, including that of Lanagan’s story, are young adults. This strikes me as almost so daft as to not be worth engaging with: you’d think that the presence of a story as confrontational as Lanagan’s would be a fairly clear marker that young adults aren’t the target audience. But apparently not. There is the grain of a sensible point here, in that if the anthology can be mistaken for a young adult anthology then a reader might be confronted with material they’re not fully equipped to handle; but having read several of the other stories in the book, and looking at the way the book is presented, I think it’s unlikely anyone would actually make that mistake.

On “shock value”: here’s the scene that (I presume) Truesdale was thinking of with reference to Hansel enjoying being abused. As context, it occurs after arriving at the mudwife’s house; Grinnan and the mudwife have in fact kicked Hansel outdoors so that they can get busy.

I try dozing, but it’s not comfortable among the roots there, and there is still noise from the cottage — now it is Grinnan working himself up, calling her all the things he calls me, all the insults. You love it, he says, with such deep disgust. You filth, you filthy cunt. And she oh‘s below, not at all like me, but as if she really does love it. I lie quiet, thinking: Is it true, that she loves it? That I do? And if it’s true, how is it that Grinnan knows, but I don’t?

Earlier this week, Victoria Hoyle was debating where she draws the line in the sand with regard to the content of fiction. It’s a valid question, and it’s not unreasonable for Truesdale to note that this story crosses his line. The problem with his critique is that he never goes any deeper than assertion – his discussion of “The Goosle” is six paragraphs long and uses the phrase “shock value” six times, which leaves the residual impression that it is the simple fact of the subject matter, rather than how it is handled, that is giving Truesdale trouble.

But this sort of thing really happens, which makes it a valid subject for fiction, and for me the handling is good enough that the story does not cross my line. In the context of the rest of the story the depiction of abuse does not strike me as exploitative, or sensationalist, or cheap. To be honest, given the hollow pain evident in that last sentence — “how is it that Grinnan knows, but I don’t?” — even in that single paragraph I think there’s enough evidence to conclude that Lanagan is approaching her topic with some care, which is to say that it strikes me — as Jeffrey Ford puts it in the comments to a post by Datlow linking to the review — as part of a portrait of how damaging, confusing, and frightening abuse can be for a child. The entire story is filled with unsettling images and situations, from the very first glimpse of the mudwife’s house — it’s clear that it’s the house of bread and cake from the fairytale, but what Hansel sees is “the dreadful roof sealed with drippy white mud … you are frightened it will choke you, but you cannot stop eating” – and it’s the accumulative weight of disorder that gives the story its power. Because of its subject matter, the story reminded me somewhat of M. Rickert’s “Holiday“; with reference to that story Jonathan Strahan says, in his year’s best, that “the best fiction challenges us in some way. The frankly disturbing dark tale that follows … was one of the most challenging published this year”, and in a year’s time it’s not hard to imagine someone saying the same of “The Goosle”. Both stories are asking us to try to understand psychologically damaged individuals. It’s true that Lanagan is (often, though not always) more direct than Rickert: where Rickert is suggestive, Lanagan tells us how Grinnan gets Hansel drunk to make him an easier mark, how Hansel was cut and bleeding after the first time Grinnan raped him, how “The price of the journey … is being spiked in the arse”. Of course it is unsettling to read, we might say. It’s meant to be. But this economically confrontational style suits Lanagan’s purpose: it makes it impossible to ignore what has been done to Hansel, and impossible to ignore the issues it raises.

Which leaves the question of what the story adds to our understanding of the Hansel and Gretel ur-story. In some ways, I think this is the wrong question to ask. As Abigail Nussbaum said elsewhere earlier this week, a reasonable way to evaluate a piece of fiction is to ask whether it does something new, or does something well; and if there have been dark extrapolations of Hansel and Gretel before (though I, at least, have not read so many as to be bored by them) then Lanagan’s is done seriously and well, and that is enough to justify its existence. For example: in the original, the background calamity is famine, which resonates in obvious ways with the gingerbread house and the witch’s proclivities; in Lanagan’s story, the land is ravaged by plague, which resonates equally obviously with the moral depravity of the adult characters. In the original, there is a neat, happy ending; in “The Goosle”, although Hansel does eventually find his way home, to do so he has to witness the most “obvious and ongoing” act of evil he has ever encountered, and when he gets home, his family has been killed by the plague. The moral order that structures the most commonly-read version of “Hansel and Gretel” is entirely absent in “The Goosle” — as Truesdale notes, it is ultimately the mudwife, not Hansel, who kills Grinnan — but that absence is surely part of the story’s point, and that it may have been done before does not diminish its impact here. Indeed, Hansel ultimately avenges Grinnan: an act which is both just (for what has been done to Grinnan is in itself horrific) and disturbing (for we can’t be completely sure that Hansel is not to some tiny degree saddened by his abuser’s death). Hansel is alternately at the mercy of the world, and ignored by it, and “The Goosle” is a tragedy.

There is also one significant way in which the story doesn’t differ from the original, which is that in both cases the witch is basically evil. In the flashbacks we get to Hansel’s original captivity, it becomes apparent that her interest in the boy, like Grinnan’s, is in part sexual — she is still hungry to eat him, but instead of feeling his finger to determine whether he is ripe, she feels his penis. And in the moments before Hansel ultimately kills her, she is described in ugly terms: “She has her back to me, her bare dirty white back, her baggy arse and thighs. If she weren’t doing what she’s doing, that would be horror enough, how everything is wet and withered and hung with hair, how everything shakes”. It’s also something that makes “The Goosle” interesting as a Margo Lanagan story, a way of evaluating the work that Truesdale doesn’t even consider. (There is nothing in his review about Lanagan’s skill with description or imagery, which is as evident here as in most of her other work.) The depiction of the mudwife put me strongly in mind of the last Lanagan story I read, “She-Creatures”, which appeared in Eclipse One. If that story has a folk antecedent I didn’t recognise it — the story is of three night-workmen being attacked by the titular creatures. But as in “The Goosle”, women are figured as terrifying and horrible — although in ways that have to do with their appearance as sexual beings than with their age – and as in “The Goosle”, sex and hunger are inextricably linked.

I originally read “She-Creatures” as an exercise in the blackest of black humour: for the narrator and his macho companions, the most terrible monsters imaginable are women who want to have sex with them. In “The Goosle”, there is no doubt that the mudwife really is both terrible and monstrous; but considering the two stories in conjunction, it’s a little scary to see how easily caricatures of women can be figured as, well, scary. I don’t think it’s an accident that in both stories, our perceptions of the women are entirely filtered through male characters who clearly do not see the targets of their gaze as full human beings, either through prejudice or inexperience. And in the case of “The Goosle” — given the familiarly misogynist positioning of women in many of Grimm’s fairytales – it adds another layer to what is already a fearsomely memorable tale.

UPDATE: See also these.

Baroque Cycle: Odalisque

Previously, on the Baroque Cycle Reading Group:

And now:

Odalisque coverLike King of the Vagabonds, Odalisque opens with a step backwards. It’s Daniel Waterhouse’s turn in the spotlight again, specifically attending the death of Charles II in February 1685. As in Quicksilver, this strand delves into the scientific happenings of the day – notably the eventual publication of Principia Mathematica, complete with a review from Leibniz that basically predicts special relativity – but the primary focus, I felt, was the politics leading up to the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It’s the same in the book’s second strand, which picks up Eliza’s story in Versailles, where she appears to be working as a governess but is fairly quickly really working as a sort of financial manager to half the resident nobles, and all the time really really working as a spy, sending letters encrypted in a cypher she knows is broken to William of Orange (and, for reasons that I missed, letters encrypted in a much stronger cypher to Leibniz). Two very different courts, then, and although there are some similarities in how the two strands unfold — such as the complete uselessness of royal physicians — of course there are two different outcomes, for in France the story is of a rebellion quashed. The title at first suggests we’re going to be primarily reading Eliza’s story, and certainly her continuing progression from slave to noble takes up more pages than Daniel’s antics; but I think the title also has a more ironic sense, which ties in with the exploration of freedom in King of the Vagabonds, in which both Daniel and Eliza are slaves to the increasing complexity of the world.

On finishing Odalisque, which is the last part of the volume Quicksilver, I am struck by two main thoughts. First, I feel entirely vindicated in, and indeed grateful for, my decision to consider the volume as three novels: it simply makes no sense as one. It may be that The Baroque Cycle as a whole should be considered as a single, three-thousand-page novel, but it certainly isn’t three thousand-page novels. There’s no sense in which the volume as a whole achieves closure – but the individual books that make up the volume do, at least as much as, say, Snow Crash does. It will be interesting to see whether the decision to interleave Bonanza and Juncto — the two novels that make up The Confusion — gives that volume more of a unifying shape. If by this you infer that I’ve been won over enough to complete the Cycle, you’d be correct, although I still have the feeling I’ll enjoy having read it more than I’m enjoying reading it.

Because the most common emotion Odalisque evoked, like the two novels before it, is frustration. There is the question, for example, of what exactly Odalisque adds to the Cycle. Why do these 300-pages exist? The basic ingredients, after all, haven’t changed. The style is the same, pages and pages of talk relating events that happened elsewhere to other people; the overwhelming dumping of information is the same; and the sense that Stephenson’s main argument is that this period encapsulates the birth-pangs of the modern world is present and correct. The strongest justification I can come up with for Odalisque’s existence is that it’s a bit less annoying than Quicksilver and a bit more coherent than King of the Vagabonds. At times, it even seems like the book is in danger of developing a plot, although it always turns out to be just the natural momentum of historical events keeping the characters on the hop.

So you can look at the basic issues raised in the earlier books, and find that if Odalisque doesn’t have anything new to say, it at least says the same things more eloquently. For instance: all three books so far have, to one extent or another, foregrounded the question of historical accuracy, and of how history can (perhaps should) be represented in fiction; but Odalisque lays out the terms of the debate most clearly. Right at the start, the issue is cued up by a conversation between Daniel and Roger Comstock. Daniel describes Leibniz’s thoughts about the perception of reality, starting with the trivial observation that London “is perceived in different ways by each person in it, depending on their unique situation” (621), going on to argue that there is a sense in which the only meaningful description of London would be the sum of the descriptions of all of its inhabitants, and concluding by suggesting that some individuals’ descriptions will be more meaningful than others:

“Normally when we say [someone is distinguished or unique], we mean that the man himself stands out from a crowd in some way. But Leibniz is saying that such a man’s uniqueness is rooted in his ability to perceive the rest of the universe with unusual clarity.” (621)

On one level, this is a way of explaining of why we read any writer: because their particular vision of the world reveals aspects of it that we did not see, or did not see as clearly, or because their vision chimes with ours. (We read Neal Stephenson because we like his geekiness.) But it’s also implicitly both an argument for Stephenson’s focus on the Great and the Good of seventeenth-century Europe in his narrative — being the people who, via Stephenson’s protagonists, can express the nature of the times most clearly – and, perhaps unconsciously, a way of highlighting the arrogance of that argument.

With this in mind, it’s notable that most of Eliza’s narrative in the book is couched in epistolary form. Initially this is satisfying because it gives us direct access to her way of seeing the world, but the ultimate point is that this form — a single viewpoint — never tells the whole story. In her last letter to Leibniz, Eliza meditates on the limitations of historical knowledge, with reference to the birth, or not, of James II’s heir. Was there really a birth, she wonders? If their was, was James II really the father? If he was, did the child really survive? And so on. “In a sense,” Eliza writes, “it does not matter, since that king is deposed, and that baby is being reared in Paris. But in another sense it matters very much…” (895). Truth exists, and truth can be sought, and in certain ways — such as Principia Mathematica — it can be found. But in other ways it cannot, and both kinds of truth (revealed and hidden) shape our world. Put another way — and Stephenson loves nothing more than to put something another way — all history is a form of cryptography. “In the plaintext story,” Eleanor writes, putting the unencrypted description of the burden she felt after the birth of her child into context for Leibniz, “it is a burden of grief over the death of my child. But in the real story — which is always more complicated — it is a burden of uncertainty” (906).

That in a thousand details the Baroque Cycle is repeatedly and visibly not “what really happened”, then, is irrelevant. (If, to me, annoying.) The standard by which the story is asking to be judged (I think) is not a standard of detail, it’s a standard of the big picture: whether or not it fairly represents how the system of the world changed during the time in question. Again, this was clear from the start of Quicksilver, but Odalisque is more convincing as an argument for this particular slant on this particular period of history, largely because the Glorious Revolution feels like more of a meaningful change than (for example) the Declaration of Indulgence. It feels like an event that can function as a synthesizing narrative without having to be forced into an unnatural shape; and the pursuit of synthesis in politics mirrors the pursuit of synthesis going on elsewhere in science. In Daniel, in fact, the two come to be inextricably intertwined. The first mentions of Newton in Odalisque point out how irreconcilable his divergent interests seem. As Daniel puts it, observers are “trying to figure out whether there might be some Reference Frame within which all of Isaac’s moves make some kind of damned sense … You want to know whether his recent work … is a change of subject, or merely a new point of view” (665). Of course, in this instance we can see the Reference Frame before the characters, because we know how gravity links tides to comets and to the movements of Jupiter and Saturn. But Daniel, in particular, becomes obsessed with how the new scientific understanding of the world might link to a new political understanding of the world; as Eliza notes, he stakes everything on the Glorious Revolution, “not in the sense of living or dying, but in the sense of making something of his life, or not” (746).

I said in my first post that I wanted to leave the question of whether or not the Cycle is science fiction for later. This seems to be a good time to visit that question, at least to reach an interim conclusion, and not just because Quicksilver was awarded the Arthur C. Clarke Award as the best science fiction novel published in the UK in 2003. The Cycle as a whole was later awarded the Locus Award for best sf novel, so clearly it’s not just an isolated group of judges who’re prepared to consider it as sf. There are several ways of responding to the question, I think. One is to say that it just doesn’t matter, to which all I can say is that I think it does: if we can read the novel as sf, it says something about the way sf is working in the early 21st century, and that to me is an interesting subject. Another response is to say that it’s trivially obvious that it’s sf: there’s Enoch Root’s longevity, for starters, not to mention the alternate-historical flavour of the whole project. But the most interesting response, I think, is the one that argues that Quicksilver is sf because it appropriates the tools of sf, because it forces us to ask what those tools are. One, perhaps, is the portrait of the world that suggests it is best described in terms of interconnection and the flow of information; that’s a familiar approach in sf, from Stand on Zanzibar through cyberpunk to a work like River of Gods; and it’s not only sf that does this, but it tends to only be sf that has the characters recognise their position in such a world and comment on it. (In fact, it’s possible to read Stephenson’s extreme enthusiasm for trivia as an argument that a way of looking at the world that emphasizes information to this degree will inevitably become overwhelming.) The build-up to the Glorious Revolution as portrayed in Odalisque struck me as sfnal for two more specific reasons, as well. First is the way that Stephenson clearly teases us with the alternate-history possibility of assassinating William of Orange: “If they happened to light on the particular stretch of beach where William goes sand-sailing, at the right time of the morning, why, they could redraw the map, and rewrite the future history, of Europe in a few minutes’ work”, says one character, to which another responds that “It is a clever conceit, like a chapter from a picaroon-romance” (652-3). And second, there seemed to be something sfnal in the way that Daniel perceives the coming revolution: as a gateway to a new world.

It is characteristic (although not universally true) of sf revolutions that they elide the pragmatic details of their construction, and focus on the world to come. There is something almost religious about this view of historical progress, and it’s a tendency Stephenson neatly draws out of Daniel, who initially argues that the Puritans who believed the Apocalypse was due in 1666 were on to something, and that they “merely got the particulars wrong … If idolatry is to mistake the symbol for the thing symbolized, then that is what they did with the symbols that are set down on the Book of Revelation … I would say that we might bring about the Apocalypse now with a little effort … not precisely the one they phant’sied, but the same, or better, in its effects” (743). Later he glorifies the process still further: “rebellion is … a petty disturbance, an aberration, predestined to fail. Revolution is like the wheeling of stars round the pole. It is driven by unseen powers, it is inexorable, it moves all things at once, and men of discrimination may understand it, predict it, benefit from it” (810). Since we know that there are still two thousand pages to go, we can assume that Daniel’s idealism is going to be sorely tested, but it falls, significantly, to Enoch to sound the cautionary note, when Daniel reiterates his grand desires:

“In a few years Mr Hooke will learn to make a proper chronometer, finishing what Mr Huygens began thirty years ago, and then the Royal Society will draw maps with lines of longitude as well as latitude, giving us a grid — what we call a Cartesian grid, though ’twas not his idea — and where there be islands, we will rightly draw them. Where there are none, we will draw none, nor dragons, nor sea-monsters — and that will be the end of Alchemy.”

“‘Tis a noble pursuit, and I wish you Godspeed,” Root said, “but remember the poles.”

“The poles?”

“The north and south poles, where your meridians will come together — no longer parallel and separate, but converging and all one.”

“That is nothing but a figment of geometry.”

“But when you build all your science upon geometry, Mr Waterhouse, figments become real.” (881)

It’s not just that who is looking matters; it’s how they’re looking. How very — dare I say it? — postmodern. The system of the world defines the world: it’s immediately after the Glorious Revolution, with its promise of a truer participatory democracy, that Stephenson tells us the word “shopping” has appeared in the English language. Welcome to consumerism. Equally, reality will always fall short of the idea, and it’s not a surprise that Daniel finds the Revolution, when it comes, somewhat anticlimactic, and makes plans to leave for another New World: he’s a utopian. He can’t stop chasing the future.

All of which probably makes it sound as though I really liked Odalisque, when in fact I thought it merely not bad. Certainly the problems with the book are less pronounced than in the earlier installments – as all of the above hopefully demonstrates, I think this time you can actually draw a coherent argument out of it – but there is fundamentally too much stuff. Individual threads may be beautiful, but the tapestry as a whole is no better than workmanlike. To be clear, I don’t think this is a case of bloat: I think everything that is in the book is meant to be in the book, because I still think Stephenson wants us to see the hints of a System of the World that makes the relations between all the disparate elements of the narrative as clear as the relations between the disparate items of Newton’s research. That, I think, is meant to be the key, which like the key to Eliza’s letters would explain why there have to be five words every time one would do, which would unlock the encryption of this history, which would reveal the plaintext. It just seems like meagre reward.

London Meeting: Terrance Dicks

A day early on this one: the guest at tomorrow’s London Meeting is author and Doctor Who script editor Terrance Dicks. He’ll be interviewed by Tim Phipps.

As ever, the venue is: The Antelope, 22 Eaton Terrace, London, SW1W 8EZ. The closest tube station is Sloane Square, and a map is here.

The meeting is free and open to anyone who’s interested, and the interview will start at 7pm, although there’ll be people around in the bar from 6; in fact, I may even aim to get there earlier, since I suspect this one will be busy.

SFF Masterclass, Summary

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The short version: I’m still processing.

The longer version: That was a lot of fun. The aim of the masterclass, says the original blurb on the Foundation website, is “to provide those who have a serious interest in sf criticism with the opportunity to exchange ideas with leading figures in the field, and also to use the SFF Collection”. Well, the latter was out of the frame this year — the Liverpool University library is being refurbished, so the class was held in London — but I’m not sure I or anyone else missed it terribly, and I’d say the first objective was resoundingly met. (From the sound of Jonathan’s summary, the post-masterclass Monday brunch at the Clutes’ place was also something to behold in this regard, but alas I couldn’t make that.) Since I don’t think I’ve explained the format of the masterclass before now, here’s the schedule:

Friday 20 June
10.00–13.00: Geoff Ryman
13.00–14.00 Lunch
14.00–17.00 Wendy Pearson

Saturday 21 June
10.00–13.00: Gary K. Wolfe
13.00–14.00 Lunch
14.00–17.00 Geoff Ryman

Sunday 22 June
10.00–13.00: Wendy Pearson
13.00–14.00 Lunch
14.00–17.00 Gary K. Wolfe

I don’t want to go into too much detail at this point about what each tutor covered, since I have ambitions of breaking that out into separate posts. But, briefly, I do want to say that I thought the three went together very well. Geoff Ryman’s sessions were about reading as a writer, first with a detailed look at Stand on Zanzibar, and then with sentence-by-sentence readings of the first chapter of Andreas Eschbach’s The Carpet Maker and Joanna Russ’s “When It Changed”. Wendy Pearson talked about postmodernism and queer theory, and then encouraged us to apply it to such stories as “Congenital Agenesis of Gender Ideation” by Raphael Carter and The Child Garden. (Hopeful Monsters would have come in here, but we never made it to that one.) And Gary Wolfe set out to persuade us that, one, trying to defend sf against attacks like this is basically futile, and may make things worse (defend the work, not the genre); and two, that most of sf’s subgenres are useless as labels, or at least should be handled with extreme caution. He also talked a bit about the practice of reviewing. And enabled some bad puns. I’d be hard-pressed to say which of these three I found the most interesting or useful; I was certainly most resistant to Pearson’s sessions, for reasons I probably need to think about a bit more, but all three contained nuggets of practical information that I can actually use.

It’s worth mentioning the venue: Kitap Evi on Tottenham High Road. As I mentioned, the Liverpool library is being refurbished, so the masterclass wouldn’t have been there whatever happened; but the original plan was for it to be held in conjunction with the SFRA conference in Dublin. Unfortunately, the Dublin meeting had to be cancelled, and a new venue was found pretty much at the last minute. Kitap Evi is a cafe downstairs and a Turkish bookshop/internet cafe upstairs, and it worked brilliantly; it was just the right size, and gave the whole meeting a nice, intimate feel. (It could perhaps have done with better ventilation upstairs in the afternoon, but that’s a minor cavil.) And the other thing to do, of course, is to thank the other masterclass attendees, all the people I mentioned in my earlier post and the rest — everyone participated in the discussions at some point, which as Jonathan said really brought home the usefulness of an extended critical community.

Other photos can be found here.

Locus Award Winners

See here; finalists here.

SF Novel
The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, Michael Chabon (HarperCollins)

I think this puts paid to the repeated suggestions that Chabon doesn’t have enough popular support to be a viable candidate for the Hugo. I think he’s going to win.

Fantasy novel
Making Money, Terry Pratchett (Doubleday UK; HarperCollins)

Young adults book
Un Lun Dun, China Miéville (Ballantine Del Rey; Macmillan UK)

First novel
Heart-Shaped Box, Joe Hill (Morrow; Gollancz)

Novella
“After the Siege”, Cory Doctorow (The Infinite Matrix Jan 2007)

Novelette
“The Witch’s Headstone”, Neil Gaiman (Wizards)

I admit to a feeling of relief that this one didn’t go to “Trunk and Disorderly”. That’s a bad story. But to be honest, “The Witch’s Headstone” felt too much like the novel-excerpt it is to really deserve this.

Short story
“A Small Room in Koboldtown”, Michael Swanwick (Asimov’s Apr/May 2007)

Collection
The Winds of Marble Arch and Other Stories, Connie Willis (Subterranean)

I’m a little surprised Doctorow didn’t win this category as well; I think I also would have preferred it to go to a new collection, rather than a retrospective. Still, Connie Willis Always Wins, I guess.

Anthology
The New Space Opera, Gardner Dozois & Jonathan Strahan, eds. (Eos)

Non-fiction
Breakfast in the Ruins, Barry N. Malzberg (Baen)

I’d have gone with (and indeed voted for) the collection of Russ’s reviews; but this is good too.

Art book
The Arrival, Shaun Tan (Lothian 2006; Scholastic)

Editor
Ellen Datlow

Magazine
F&SF

Publisher
Tor

Artist
Charles Vess

Overall: for me a solid list of winners, but — particularly in the short fiction categories — not a particularly exciting one.

SFF Masterclass, Day One

So, today was the first day of the long-anticipated Science Fiction Foundation Masterclass in SF Criticism, 2008 edition, at which several denizens of these parts were present. (And a bunch of other people too.) The format was straightforward: a morning session led by Geoff Ryman, structured as a writer’s close reading of Stand on Zanzibar, and an afternoon session led by Wendy Pearson, in which we discussed postmodernism, queer theory, and “The Congenital Agenesis of Gender Ideation”. It would be fair to say I’m still digesting many of the issues the day raised, but it was all thoroughly stimulating. As a teaser, here are Geoff Ryman’s four tests for judging whether formal innovation in fiction is successful:

  1. It should not be confusing. The purpose of formal innovation is to provide greater insight into or access to either emotion or information; it should work without needing an instruction manual (or critics) to explain it.
  2. It should be fun. To take form seriously is to overvalue it; formal innovation is (or should be) driven by wit, freedom, and playfulness.
  3. It should be useful for something that couldn’t be achieved another way.
  4. It should do more than one thing at a time (as should most elements of prose fiction)

The Link Garden

Stand on Zanzibar

Superpowers UK coverThe plot: probably the least interesting aspect of the whole book, but here you go. There are two main threads, developing from the lives of two room-mates in 2010 New York, both of which involves first-world intervention in third-world nations. Norman House, VP at General Technics, ends up managing a huge investment in the (fictional) ex-colonial African nation of Beninia, at the behest of the ailing president; meanwhile, Donald Hogan, who works as an information synthesizer for the government, is “activated”, brainwashed with super-action-spy-skills, and sent to the (equally fictional) South-East Asian island nation Yatakang, where the government has announced they have the capability to create genetically enhanced supermen. Surrounding this narrative is a penumbra of vignettes, extracts from books, song lyrics, transcripts of videos, and much else, often but not always related to the main action in some way, which serve to flesh out the world.

What they thought then, part one: M. John Harrison, New Worlds 186 (January 1969):

… an application of the Dos Passos technique to the speculative field, a massive collage of a book that offers a broad fictional extrapolation from current events. Brunner presents as his protagonist an unbalanced society, consumer oriented and consuming itself to death. Violence and the special poverties of utopia set the tone; race riots; genetic control, and an East-West confrontation are balanced by ephemeral close-ups of personal frustration. Admass manipulators attempting to peg the status quo demolish human dignity from above while guerilla-action and anarchy attack it from below. This is a well-conceived book — a satisfyingly complete vision — marred by a lack of metaphor. Brunner is an inventive writer; his ability to theorise and document a feasible future is undeniable. But his success in evoking that future through images is limited. And his solution of the violence problem, though clever, is superfluous — it might have been more effective simply to state the problem.

What they thought then, part two: It won the Hugo in 1969, beating Rite of Passage by Alexei Panshin, Nova by Samuel R Delany, Past Master by RA Lafferty, and The Goblin Reservation by Clifford D. Simak.

Commentary, part one: Harrison is surely right about the completeness of Stand on Zanzibar‘s future being its most satisfying aspect; as is the way in any multi-threaded novel, not every thread is equally interesting all of them time, but every thread in is interesting at some point. The sheer number of trends extrapolated is staggering, and not just because some of the predictions seem spookily accurate, but because they’re integrated in a way that makes them seem part of the same society, and because Brunner is quite bold in connecting his present to his future — there’s even a complete history of fashion, at one point. I’m not sure, though, that the balance is completely satisfactory — I would have liked to believe that the world was the true character, say, but Hogan and House kept getting in the way — and I’m not sure that I buy Harrison’s take on the ending, which is surely powerful precisely because the solution it identifies is beyond the reach of the characters to grasp.

I haven’t read any of the other novels on that year’s Hugo shortlist, but it strikes me as a worthy winner.

The structure: There are four types of chapter, which largely do what they say, although there is some fluidity of material and style between different types. “Context” provides, typically, an extract from a book, or some other document, or a transcript of something or other, which explains the background of this 2010. “This Happening World” is about tracking the real-time of the world, and mixes thing up: a couple of lines of dialogue, an advertising slogan, a couple of lines from an article of some kind. “Tracking with Closeups” are the character vignette chapters, minor characters who may appear later in the main Hogan/House plot, or who may just be glancingly affected by some aspect of it. And “Continuity” is the meat of the story. As many will tell you (the detractors, cheerfully so), the style is more or less lifted from John Dos Passos’ USA; but for obvious infodump-related reasons, it’s a style extraordinarily well-suited to science fiction (and to this type of science fiction), and Brunner makes good use of it. It’s a steal for honorable purpose.

Vocabulary, a selection: Zecks (executives); Codders (men); Bleeding (swearword); Sheeting (ditto); Mucker (someone run amok); Block (never quite worked this one out); Shiggy (sort of a professionally single woman); Afram (African American); Hole (swearword, replaces “hell”); prowlie (police car); orbiting (getting high). Some of this works, some of it doesn’t. While the thought behind, say, “bleeding” is good — it’s replaced words like “bastard” and “bugger”, which are now considered purely descriptive without stigma attached to them, while hemophilia, as a heritable disease, is something to be ashamed of — I could never quite hear anyone saying it with the necessary force. In general I admired Brunner’s attempts at stylistic diversity, without thinking all of them equally successful.

What they thought a bit later: Brian Aldiss, p 367 of Trillion Year Spree (1986):

This sort of unlikely and unpleasant melodrama militates against the lively intellectual dance going on elsewhere, and eventually overwhelms it. Before that, Brunner conducts a teach-in on modern moralities, aided by Chad Mulligan, a sort of hippie philosopher. As with all Propter-figures, as with Heinlein’s Jubal Harshaw, Mulligan wearies, being an author mouthpiece. He puts us all to rights and even out-talks Shalmaneser. The book becomes too long. … But it is an interesting experiment, because it marks a stage along the road, midway between pulp and social commentary.

Commentary, part two: I don’t disagree with Aldiss’ assessment of the way House/Hogan’s story gradually becomes overpowering (see above), but I thought Chad Mulligan livened up the book considerably, something I emphatically cannot say about the Heinleinian equivalents. Perhaps it’s because I never did feel he was an author mouthpiece, at least not in the sense that I believed Brunner believed everything he had Mulligan say, or that I was expected to believe it; in the sense that Mulligan was a way of spinning out notions in front of an audience, maybe. Perhaps, also, it’s because I feel that Mulligan gets to put his finger on the heart of the book when he asks Shalmaneser what it would take for the computer to believe in Beninia. Suspension of disbelief is a key question for any book that positions itself anywhere along the utopia/dystopia line: what would it take for us to believe in the possibility of a better world, or better people?

Predictions, part one: accurate. Implanted contraceptives. Hyperactive media. Gay marriage. TiVo. Genetic modification (and industrial pharma, to an extent). Privacy, or lack thereof, as a key social issue. Puffa jackets. Globalisation.

Genre descendents: Big chunks of cyberpunk; maybe The Gold Coast by Kim Stanley Robinson; Counting Heads by David Marusek; River of Gods by Ian McDonald.

Predictions, part two: inaccurate. The reliance on big central computers. The absence of peak oil and climate change. Continuing cold war-esque paranoia. The introduction of eugenics laws to control population growth. Sexual mores.

On shiggies: I have to say, I didn’t find the gender roles nearly as outdated or troubling as I’d been led to expect, which is not to say the book is unproblematic in this area. On the plus side, the shiggies — essentially the free love movement extrapolated into a whole social class — were depicted, so far as I noticed, without a trace of disapproval, and there were numerous female characters in prominent and powerful roles (not least the head of General Technics). What was missing, though, was a sense of balance, which in a way is a microcosm of my reservations about the novel’s overall structure, which is to say that although lots of female characters are mentioned, and have speaking parts, none of them are central in the way that Hogan, House and Mulligan are. Similarly, I’d have expected there to be male shiggies as well as female shiggies, and I didn’t notice any.

What they think now, part one: Adam Roberts, p.248 of his Palgrave History of Science Fiction (2006):

Other titles from the decade now seem less significant, despite being praised extravagantly in their own day. The British author John Brunner’s (1934-1995) Stand on Zanzibar (1968) is a lengthy disquisition layered over a sort of spy plot, set in a monstrously overpopulated world. But its choppy, “experimental” style, lifted directly from the work of the American Modernist John Dos Passos (1896-1970) seems second-hand and over-boiled, and the premise of the novel has a phlogistonic lack of contemporary bite (overpopulation had not brought the world to a standstill by the start of the twenty-first century, and will not do so by the start of the twenty-second either). Of course, Brunner was not alone in thinking his premise sharply relevant: many writers in the 1960s and 1970s adopted positions of Malthusian gloominess on the subject of overpopulation; a better treatment of the theme than Brunner’s (better because rooted in a Pulp terseness rather than a High Modernist prolixity) is Harry Harrison’s (b.1925) Make Room! Make Room! (1966).

What they think now, part two: Geoff Ryman, in SFX 168 (April 2008) [pdf]:

Every page has both a great SF idea and an emotional twist to the story. Its technique is kaleidoscopic … This wouldn’t work if Brunner wasn’t so good at different voices. This age’s hip commentator, Chad Mulligan, is quoted from at length. To an extent he’s Brunner’s mouthpiece (and a great way to info-dump) but he also convinces as a radical and original thinker … The world feels pretty much like now — which is when it’s set, not in 1968, the year it was first published … there is no other British SF novel I can think of with this breadth of invention, character and setting. There is something of Dickens in the vast panorama, the mix of wit, terror, sentiment, and satirical characters.

Commentary, part three: I find myself somewhere between messrs Roberts and Ryman. I don’t think the kaleidoscopic view is entirely successful; but nor do I think it by any means stale, particularly early on, when the disorienting effect of immersion is at its most powerful. Roberts is right to point out that the concerns about overpopulation don’t feel as pressing as they apparently did when Brunner was writing the book, but the way in which it asks what it is about humans that limits our ability to live together, that seems to make terrorism or solipsism such common responses to living in Brunner’s future, chimed with me. It also seemed to me a novel provocative on the subject of racial issues and interactions (much more so, actually, than on gendered ones; take that as you will), asking valid questions about postcolonial global relations. What it takes for countries to live together, if you like, and whether benevolent intervention is even possible (whether or not desirable). Which is to say that in many ways it did still feel like now; an alternate version of now, admittedly, but a tomorrow I could recognise.

See also: Wikipedia page here; Karen Burnham’s take here.

The Happening

If I see one more review that lambasts an M. Night Shyamalan film for not having a twist, I’m going to scream. It happens every time they’re released: a certain proportion of reviewers are apparently so unable to evaluate a film on its own that they reinterpret Shyamalan’s effort through a filter of expectation that, inevitably, does it no favours. This is by no means to say that Shyamalan is some maligned genius: Lady in the Water, for instance, was a mess. But while The Happening is by no means perfect, it is an idiosyncratic, interesting experiment that succeeds more than it fails. It’s unsettling at points, and scary twice; expect a twist, though, and you’ll be disappointed.

What you get, as many reviews have noted, is a B-movie disaster by way of Alfred Hitchcock. The film lives up to both halves of that comparison in multiple ways. For the first half, there’s the basic premise behind the happening itself — which, if you haven’t seen a trailer, is that people suddenly start committing mass suicide for no apparent reason. Given that the first tentative explanations are proposed just as the characters are approaching a small town called Hokum, I think it’s fairly clear that we’re not meant to take it entirely seriously (if I did, I would have to conclude that it’s based on an understanding of plant biology that is either much deeper than my own or much, much worse; but this is a film in which all science is Science, with a capital S). Moreover, both the acting and the dialogue are heavily stylised — but in a broad monster movie way, rather than the low-key, heavily naturalistic way of Shyamalan’s earlier films, with lots of heavily telegraphed reaction shots, and clunky observations. And the couple at the heart of the film (Mark Wahlberg and Zooey Deschanel) are almost unnaturally wholesome, in a way that recalls caricatures of ’50s America. Wahlberg’s character seems lost and bewildered, while Deschanel’s secret shame, endearingly, is that she went out for dessert with another man. Both frequently make big eyes at the screen, and each other.

But Shyamalan must know he’s set himself a near-impossible task in his choice of story, because at first glance it requires him to make inanimate objects scary. (It actually requires him to make an invisible force scary, a much easier sell because it can be made visible through its effect on people, but there’s still an initial hurdle to jump.) Which is where the second half of my earlier comparison comes in, because to a large extent he gets away with it. The Happening has a lot more laughs than you’d expect, almost all of which come from character interaction, or from moments when characters acknowledge that what’s happening is simply bizarre; and then something horrible will happen. Which is to say that although the film acknowledges, in various ways, its hokeyness, Shyamalan follows its implications through with conviction, often playing on the tension between terror and laughter. It helps that he’s admirably callous about killing off supporting characters (a lot of whom are very deftly drawn; I particularly liked the jittery private who’s seen most of his base kill themselves), and it helps that he excels at set-pieces and disturbing images. People walking off a building, as seen from the street; or a shot of a gun being successively picked up and then dropped by people shooting themselves in the head; or a car that starts accelerating towards something off-screen, such that you only get a second to realise that the driver’s lost it and is heading for a tree; or a mass hanging. Sometimes he shows you something traditionally gruesome, but more often he manages to make you think he’s going to show you something gruesome, and then pulls away at the last second.

Moreover, there’s much less of a sense of hubris about this film than there was about Shyamalan’s recent efforts. There’s no architect-figure cameo, for instance — indeed, unless I blinked and missed it, no cameo at all. There’s an ecological message, but it’s not thumped home, largely because the most portentious dialogue is placed in the mouths of characters whose grasp on reality may be a bit more fragile than the average; the film is pacy, and over quicker than you expect, if sometimes shamelessly contrived in its plotting; and in general, it feels like a film that sets out to please its audience, rather than its director. It may or may not succeed in that — reviews suggest that I’m in a minority, although the audience I saw it with seemed to get into the spirit of things — but for its distinctively personal approach, I’m bound to admire it. Perhaps I can pay The Happening no higher compliment than this: I can’t wait to see what Nick Lowe makes of it.